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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 002701

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DEPARTMENT FOR NEA, NEA/ARP, NEA/EX, S/CT, CA, DS/DSS,
CENTCOM FOR POLAD

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TAGS: [PTER](#) [PREL](#) [IR](#) [YM](#) [COUNTER](#) [TERRORISM](#)

SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S 11/8/03 CT COORDINATION MEETING WITH
MOI/PSO DIRECTORS

Classified By: CTC AUSTIN G. GILREATH, for reasons 1.5 (b) and (d).

11. (C) Summary: On 8 November 2003, the Ambassador was called to a meeting with Minister of the Interior, Dr. Rashad al-Alimi, and the Director of the Political Security Organization, BG Ghalib al-Qamish, to discuss current levels of cooperation on the counter-terrorism front. The Ambassador presented a number of requests for further information on threats to American targets and details of Al-Qa,ida presence in Sana,a, and reaffirmed the need for the ROYG to commit fully in word and deed to the Global War On Terrorism. Alimi and Qamish confirmed Yemen,s interest in cooperating with America. End summary.

THE AL-SHARIF CELL

12. (C) The Ambassador told attendees that based on information given to him by MOI Alimi on the 28 October, he understood that the Amr al-Sharif al-Qa,ida cell arrested in September 2003 had attempted to conduct two attacks on the Ambassador,s motorcade. The Ambassador requested additional information, to include weapons, locations and timings of the aborted attacks. The Ambassador also asked for additional threat targeting information, developed from cell member interrogations, on western restaurants, institutes, USG residences and the Hadda Compound. The Ambassador told the attendees that because the cell members were currently in jail, and the arrest team had discovered a wealth of information (computer disks, written targeting packets, and casing videotape), these requests were not unreasonable.

13. (C) After some initial confusion regarding the existence or non-existence of a videotape containing casing information of the British Embassy, Dr. Alimi finally produced the original and promised that copies would be made and delivered to the embassy and the British Ambassador. (Comment: It appears PSO, the designated conduit for materials, was not provided with a key piece of material. End comment)

14. (S/NF) The Ambassador said that it was his understanding that seventeen individuals had been arrested in connection to the cell. The Ambassador asked why their names had not been provided to the Embassy yet. Qamish told the Ambassador that he had indeed provided those names to his liaison Pol/Mil contact at the Embassy. After the meeting, the Pol/Mil Section Head confirmed to the Ambassador that he has not received any of these names, but that he would check with PSO liaison to see if such material was in the pipeline. Subsequently, the names were turned over in memo format on 9 November.

THE IRANIAN DEPORTEES

15. (S/NF) Referring to a recent Yemeni press article detailing the extradition by Iran to Yemen of thirteen Yemeni al-Qa,ida terrorists, the Ambassador pointedly asked attendees why the Embassy, and officials in Washington, had to receive such information late from open sources and not early from our committed CT partners in the ROYG. Qamish responded that this was in fact old news and that the transfer had taken place in January 2003. He continued by saying that these individuals had targeted objectives outside of Yemen, did not present a threat to the Embassy, and that it was a Yemeni-Iranian matter. The Ambassador asked if Embassy interlocutors had been made aware of the transfer during the time of its execution, and attendees responded that while Washington knew of the transfer, the names had not been conveyed at the Iranians' request. Qamish said he would provide these names in official channels since Iran has now leaked them.

ESCAPED FUGITIVES

16. (C) The Ambassador queried the current status of ROYG efforts to capture Ahmed al-Quso and Jamal Muhamad Ahmad Ali al-Badawi. Attendees confirmed that the two individuals were in Yemen, but that they did not have specific locational data on the fugitives. Attendees confirmed that two of the ten March 2003 Aden prison escapees had been recaptured. Qamish again reiterated that if the Embassy had any information on the current location of Abu Asim al-Makki, this information should be turned over to the PSO.

17. (C) Comment: A joint Alimi/Qamish meeting is rare, and this one was at the Yemenis request. It was obviously an effort by the Yemenis to respond to concerns raised by FBI Director Mueller and the Ambassador. (Septel) The episode of the missing UK Embassy videotape indicates the lack of coordination between Yemeni agencies. In Ambassador,s judgment, it illustrates dramatically why we need to develop close and constant contact with the MOI. Embassy,s DCM will take the lead in this regard. End comment.

MISENHEIMER